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Introduction  
The role of Mayors and other council chairs in Northern Ireland local 
government has attracted little attention from historians or political scientists. The 
literature has been dominated by research on the ‘high’ politics of the ‘troubles’, 
including detailed speculation over the conflict’s party political aspects1. Indeed, 
Northern Ireland local government, with some notable exceptions
2
, is a largely under-
researched area because of the emasculated nature of councils. Local authorities were 
stripped of key functional responsibilities under the Local Government Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1972 in response to a litany of sectarian practices aimed at consolidating the 
hegemonic Unionist state from the 1920s. In 1973 core public services (education, 
housing and social services), typically delivered by local government in the rest of the 
United Kingdom, were vested in the hands of appointed boards accountable to British 
ministers under ‘direct rule’ from Westminster. Hence, the role of the Mayor/Chair in 
local government is largely symbolic but hugely significant in a province where 
symbolism is pervasive in the form of flags, emblems, parades, anthems and 
paramilitary paraphernalia marking out republican and loyalist territories
3
. Yet as one 
political initiative after another failed to ‘solve’ the constitutional crisis in Northern 
Ireland, local government became the only forum for expressing the political views of 
elected representatives. The role of the Mayor/Chair became pivotal to the emergence 
of power-sharing (or ‘responsibility sharing’ as unionists prefer to call it). This, in 
turn, offered a model for proportionality (d’Hondt allocation of committee chairs1) 
and arrangements for cross-community consent in the devolved Northern Ireland 
Assembly from December 1999
4
.  
 
This chapter attempts three tasks. First, it explores the context of the debate 
about the constitutional position and role of the chair/mayor in Northern Ireland local 
government since 1898, while emphasising the most recent period from 1972 
onwards. Second, it considers how, despite local government’s functional 
unimportance, the election of one high-profile republican Mayor (Alex Maskey) to 
Belfast City Council, a bastion of unionist power and supremacy, offered wider 
                                                 
1
 The d’Hondt system, also known as the highest average method, is named after Victor d’Hondt, a 
Belgian lawyer. The principle of the system is that seats are won singly and successively on the basis of 
the highest average. The method requires that the number of seats each party gained in the Assembly is 
divided initially by one and thereafter by one more that the number of seats won, until all the seats are 
won. 
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potential for power-sharing arrangements.  Finally, in the light of an ongoing major 
review of local government, it discusses what the future offers for mayors/chairs in 
Northern Ireland.  
 
Background 
Local government in Northern Ireland is the product of the Local Government 
(Ireland) Act 1898 which in turn derived from the 1888 and 1894 legislation for 
England and Wales. First, the 1898 Act
5
 established a two-tier system of local 
government in which county boroughs (the six largest towns: Dublin, Cork, Limerick, 
Waterford, Belfast, Londonderry) and county councils formed the upper tier, and 
urban and rural districts the lower tier. Second, the public health functions of the Poor 
Law guardians in rural areas were transferred to the rural district councils. Third, the 
Act rationalised local government boundaries, eliminating overlapping jurisdictions. 
Fourth, a simplified rating system, based on a single assessment for all local 
government purposes, was introduced. Finally, the Act extended the local government 
franchise to include all adult male ratepayers, thereby rendering the new county 
councils as foci of growing nationalist agitation for the separation of Ireland from the 
United Kingdom. Overall, this legislation established the local government structure 
obtaining in Ireland at the time of the establishment of the Irish Free State and 
devolved government of Northern Ireland.  
 
When the ‘free state’ was created in 1920, Northern Ireland’s devolved 
government consisted of six counties, which formed the administrative state. Within 
the six counties the local government framework comprised 2 county boroughs, 6 
county councils, 10 boroughs, 24 urban districts and 31 rural districts; a total of 73 
local authorities, serving a population (by 1966) of about 1.4 million people. This 
ranged from Tandragee Urban District Council, with 1,300 inhabitants, to the city of 
Belfast with 407,000
6
. Elections were held triennially and all councils except rural 
districts had rating functions. They fulfilled the same roles as their British 
counterparts with the exception of protective services like police and civil defence. 
The post-1920 period witnessed several controversial changes wherein ‘the 
invincibility of the Unionist local government system was carefully constructed and 
maintained’7. 
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The first step in this process began with the 1922 Local Government (Northern 
Ireland) Act which: replaced proportional representation (PR) with simple majority 
elections; enabled the redrawing of electoral divisions and ward boundaries once PR 
had been removed; and, altered the franchise by incorporating property ownership as 
a qualification for the vote. In short, the mechanisms for Unionist hegemony were 
established, or as O’Dowd et al put it: 
 
While Britain and the Irish Republic had been democratising local 
government, the Unionist Government was consolidating its grip on local 
politics by fixing ward boundaries, by distributing votes to the propertied, and 
by disenfranchising the propertyless... The abolition of PR and the 
reconstruction of wards and the franchise meant that, for rural and county 
councils, elections were hardly necessary. The only question for Unionists to 
resolve was who was chosen to serve on the local council
8
. 
 
Growing recognition of the inadequacy of local government machinery to 
provide services efficiently became apparent from 1940 onwards. Loughran noted that 
it ‘has not made any considerable contribution to the development of Northern Ireland 
since the war’9. This is evidenced by the growth of ad hoc statutory bodies and the 
removal and centralisation of local government functions (hospitals, fire, electricity 
and housing). Pressure for reform eventually surfaced in the 1960s from two 
complementary sources. First, the Northern Ireland government at Stormont started 
campaigning to modernise the system from March 1966, and remedy its defects – 
mainly the multiplicity of small local authorities existing with small rateable bases 
and hence limited financial resources. Of the 73 councils, 27 had population of fewer 
than 1,000 people, and 46 had rateable values where one penny produced less than 
£50010. Many councils were therefore neither administratively or financially viable. 
Second, there was ongoing dissatisfaction with gerrymandered electoral wards and the 
restricted franchise, which contributed to the disturbances of 1968. Local politics 
were dominated by sectarian considerations. Unionists controlled a disproportionate 
share of local authorities with disproportionately large majorities – few councils 
changed hands at local elections. Buckland noted, ‘local government remained an 
outstanding grievance, with Unionist majorities bolstered by discriminatory housing 
practices, carefully drawn electoral areas and the persistent refusal to adopt the British 
practice of one man (sic), one vote’11. Minority community grievances about housing 
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and employment helped motivate the 1968 civil rights protest and the subsequent 
outbreak of civil disturbances.  
 
Local government history up to and during the 1960s is best characterised by 
the Town Clerk of Downpatrick Council who subsequently became a permanent 
secretary and Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. Recounting his time in local 
government, he wrote: 
 
Majorities were winners: they took the spoils and held the field. Councils were 
‘won’ or ‘lost’, positions so well entrenched, heads so well counted that 
change rarely took place. Offices were not shared, committees, where they 
existed, were dominated by majorities; minorities knew their place and took 
the crumbs with as much grace as possible
12
. 
 
Hayes relates the story of a veteran nationalist councillor who, finding himself in 
hospital with a minor ailment, joked to the nurse when she removed the bedpan, ‘I’ve 
been on the council for twenty years and that’s the first motion I’ve ever had 
carried!’13. The invincibility of the Unionist-dominated local government system 
carefully constructed from 1922 onwards was, however, about to be threatened. Up 
until then, the role of elected council chairs was simply to hold the party line, reaffirm 
majoritarianism, and share the spoils of a political system buttressed by 
gerrymandering and a restricted franchise. Yet, even within Northern Ireland’s highly 
insular and sectarian milieu, the qualities or competencies of a chair were important: 
 
While officials are there to serve all members and no single party, the 
chairman is the key figure, both in the procedures and in ensuring the efficient 
disposal of the public part of the business. His (sic) personality too will have a 
great bearing on the way in which members behave – amicably or with 
animosity, and since he is often the public face of the council, it helps if it is a 
restrained and dignified one
14
. 
 
A series of reforms initiated by the Stormont government in November 1968 
modernised local government structures, reformed the franchise, including abolishing 
the company vote, introduced a points system for housing, and established/appointed 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. Michael Farrell described these as 
‘too little, to later; …enough to outrage loyalists without satisfying the civil rights 
movement at all’15. By October 1969 local government had been stripped of its 
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responsibility for housing and a decision made to create a centralised housing agency 
(the Northern Ireland Housing Executive).  In December 1969 the Minister of 
Development with overall responsibility for local government initiated a review 
chaired by Patrick Macrory.  
 
The Macrory Report (1970) divided services into regional (requiring large 
administrative units) and district (suitable for small areas) services. The Stormont 
parliament was to take responsibility for regional services and district councils would 
administer district services. Macrory recommended establishing 26 borough or district 
councils and setting up appointed boards to decentralise the administration of 
centrally provided health and education services. The recommendations were 
subsequently passed into law under the Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 
1972. Macrory’s proposals were however overtaken by Stormont’s abolition in 1972 
and the imposition of ‘direct rule’ from Westminster. 
Local Government in Northern Ireland 
 
Figure 1: Map by Conal Kelly - CAIN website 
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Local government since 1973: emerging consensus? 
The most significant changes introduced by the 1972 Local Government Act 
(Northern Ireland) were new local government boundaries (see figure 1), universal 
adult suffrage, and the replacement of simple plurality voting by proportional 
representation (the single-transferable-vote). The new district councils came into 
operation on 1
st
 October 1973 and have remained largely unchanged since then, 
although a major review of public administration is currently underway which will 
reform local government once more
16
. 
 
The allocation of powers to local authorities was confined to the provision of a 
limited, and outwardly uncontroversial, range of services: refuse collection and 
disposal, leisure and community services, street cleaning, parks and tourism. Some 
582 councillors now represent 1.68 million people in Northern Ireland. Councils have 
4 main functions – ceremonial functions associated with civic leadership; the direct 
provision of the public services; a representative role where councillors are appointed 
to a number of public bodies; and a consultative role whereby government 
departments responsible for functions like planning, roads, water and conservation 
engage with councils about service provision within their areas. 
 
Under the provisions of the 1972 Act councils were initially designated as 
‘district councils’ but they could be granted city or borough status in certain 
circumstances. Or as section 2 puts it: ‘a council may, in pursuance of a special 
resolution of the council, submit a petition to the Governor praying for the grant of a 
charter designating the district of the council a borough’. The two largest councils – 
Belfast and Derry – retained their city status, whilst Armagh was granted it by royal 
order in March 1995, and Lisburn and Newry attained theirs in 2002. Fourteen other 
councils have obtained borough status either because of charters applying in their area 
before 1973 or through petitions for new charters since 1973. The title for the head of 
the council is determined by the council’s status. Hence district councils have a 
chairperson; city and borough councils a mayor; and Belfast City Council a Lord 
Mayor. City and borough councils may designate up to one quarter of their 
councillors with the ceremonial title of ‘alderman’.  The typical role of the Mayor is 
described by Lisburn City Council thus: 
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 As first citizen of the city, the Mayor will actively lead on all matters of civic 
life, take responsibility for chairing council meetings, undertake the 
management of the full council, and positively represent the City of Lisburn 
and its residents to the wider community both domestically and 
internationally
17
. 
 
In spite of the councils’ radically reduced powers since 1973, local 
government has been the focus of revitalised electoral competition. In 1973 there 
were 1,222 candidates for 526 seats compared to the previous local government 
election (1967) where a majority of seats were uncontested. The political composition 
of councils also reflects the PR electoral system, there being relatively few where one 
party has an overall majority. There is also greater representation of minority parties. 
 
Despite its innocuous powers, local government became immersed in wider 
constitutional controversy when in the 1985 elections 59 Sinn Féin councillors, 
representing the political wing of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, secured 
seats. Unionists perceived Sinn Féin’s electoral strategy (the infamous mantra of the 
‘ballot box and armalite’) as a threatening new dimension in local government and 
marked their displeasure by disrupting its operation. Some councils adjourned 
business and all 18 Unionist controlled local authorities refused to carry out normal 
duties. Varying degrees of conflict ensued, with occasional fist-fights in council 
chambers over the presence of Sinn Féin.  The disruption campaign was superseded 
by a hard-line campaign against the Anglo-Irish Agreement of November 1985. All 
Unionist councils adjourned in protest, refusing to levy district rates. The courts 
ordered several indicted councils to resume normal business and set a rate. The local 
government forum had, by this stage, become embroiled in a constitutional protest of 
defiance against the Agreement, well beyond its remit, and clashed variously with 
central government and the courts.  Fines were imposed by the high courts against 
recalcitrant councils (Belfast and Castlereagh, for example) and legal censure against 
others (Lisburn, Antrim and Coleraine). Confronted by such set-backs, support for the 
protest dwindled and from early 1988 it petered out
18
.  
 
The local 1989 government elections marked a turning-point in council 
chambers, with a degree of moderation appearing not unrelated to the decline in 
representation from the political extremes. Dungannon District Council is credited 
 10 
with leading the way through an experiment in responsibility- or power-sharing. It 
established a special committee, which passed a resolution recognising ‘responsibility 
as an important step which might help us to develop trust in the community’19. It was 
agreed that the position of the chair would be rotated, every six months, between 
council members ‘who deplore violence and seek to pursue political progress by 
political means’.  This effectively excluded Sinn Féin from responsibility-sharing, 
while the Democratic Unionist Party refused to partake. The rotation of the chair, in 
effect, alternated power between the main unionist (UUP) and nationalist (SDLP) 
blocs at that time. Given unionist fury about wider political developments in the 
province, Dungannon’s decision to rotate the chair must be viewed as a major step 
forward in relations between unionists and nationalists. 
 
Other councils followed suit in the wake of the 1989 local elections. Eleven 
local authorities appointed chairs/mayors and deputies from both political traditions. 
The power-sharing trend continued following the 1993 local elections, with 12 
councils participating and, according to one observer, an upbeat mood emerging about 
its longer-term prospects: 
 
There may be some hope in Ulster’s new councils. The Ulster Unionist Party, 
Alliance and the SDLP have expressed varying degrees of enthusiasm for 
‘partnership’, code word for sharing the main positions of authority… There 
are several local councils where a combination of these three parties can form 
the critical mass necessary to take control and to blur the orange/green divide. 
A growth in power sharing would to a great deal to change the mood music of 
Ulster politics and to build trust between parties, which is the necessary 
precursor to a larger accommodation
20
. 
 
Power-sharing councils (see appendix 1) were not however a haven of tranquillity and 
co-operation. Controversy flared over many issues, causing fundamental divisions 
between the parties. During 1992-93, for example and in proper power-sharing spirit, 
the SDLP elected DUP Councillor William Hay as mayor of Derry City Council. 
During his tenure, Hay refused to meet with both the (then) Irish President, Mary 
Robinson, and (then) Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds. The SDLP claimed that Hay as 
mayor had failed in his mayoral duty to represent the wishes of Derry’s majority. 
Divisions also emerged in Newry & Mourne Council when the nationalist council 
chair proposed a motion condemning road traffic delays caused by army checkpoints 
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in South Armagh (locally referred to as ‘bandit country’). Despite a policy of co-
operation, unionists could not support such a motion. In the same council area, 
however, all political parties, except Sinn Féin, condemned the bombing of a local 
hotel by the IRA and the killing of a British soldier. 
 
Minor partners in power-sharing arrangements were sometimes more cynical 
about the use of council chairs to maintain a façade of harmony. As one Ulster 
Unionist councillor put it: 
 
Derry City Council has always been portrayed nationally and internationally 
as a shining example of how nationalists will treat unionists and, in reality, it 
is quite different. It is not a power-sharing council. In all committees and 
meetings there is an SDLP majority. So no matter who chairs a meeting or 
who is the mayor, the SDLP still control the council and on every issue they 
operate a strong party whip. If unionists were in power we would probably be 
doing the exact same thing
21
. 
 
Whilst rotating the chair or mayoral position up to this point appealed to middle-
ground parties, power sharing of whatever hue was anathema to the DUP who argued 
it was contrary to the principle of majority rule in a democracy. Sinn Féin’s position 
was dictated by what advantages the party gained from specific power-sharing 
arrangements.  
 
Symbolism matters 
The role that the chair, mayor or lord mayor played in local government, as 
explored thus far, characterises the wider political milieu within which this 
governmental tier has existed. From 1922 onwards, local political heads reinforced 
unionist hegemony to such an extent that local government became a core grievance 
in the civil rights movement of the late-1960s. Tomlinson highlights the symbolic 
importance of Belfast Corporation in strengthening unionist supremacy: ‘Protestant 
bourgeois patronage, operating through the local government system on the basis of 
carefully concocted electoral districts and restricted franchise, was well fortified 
against political and economic forces for change’22. With reorganisation in 1972/3, 
not least through boundary reorganisation and changes to the voting system, unionist 
dominance decreased. Although local government’s diminished functional importance 
made the role of chair, mayor or lord mayor less significant, what happened in 
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councils became a barometer of the wider political process. With the imposition of 
Westminster direct rule in 1972, British governments presided over a series of failed 
initiatives attempting to restore devolution to Northern Ireland. This involved giving 
constitutional guarantees to unionists on their position within the United Kingdom 
and delivering some sort of power-sharing arrangements between Catholics and 
Protestants within an all-Ireland framework
23
. The 1972-73 power-sharing executive, 
the 1975 constitutional convention, the 1980 talks-about-talks, 1982 rolling 
devolution and the Northern Ireland Assembly, 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, 
Brooke/Mayhew party talks, Hume/Adams peace plan, the 1993 Joint Declaration and 
the 1995 Framework Documents all testify to initiatives which raised hopes and 
foundered. In the meantime local government was the only democratic forum around. 
Even since the historic Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 1998, political and 
administrative stability have proved elusive. With the Northern Ireland Assembly now 
suspended (since October 2002) for the fourth time, local government remains in 
place, albeit emasculated in form
24
. 
 
The key contribution, which heads of state at local-government level have 
made, is to embed the principle of power-sharing that has been pivotal to the Belfast 
Agreement. Hence, what had been happening in local government for some time, 
presided over by chairs, mayors or lord mayors, became the blueprint for a devolved 
Northern Ireland Assembly. Legislative Assembly members (MLAs) are elected by 
PR (STV). The election of the chair and deputy-chair of the Assembly, main 
committees, and the power-sharing executive are made on the basis of proportionality 
using d’Hondt. Key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis (either through 
parallel consent or weighted majority). As one leader-writer put it at the beginning of 
the 2001 local government elections:   
 
Some council chambers, most notably Belfast City Hall, once earned a 
reputation for being sectarian bearpits. But tensions have eased and local 
government has played its part in changing the face of Northern Ireland 
politics. Although mayoral rotation has not worked everywhere, many 
councils blazed a trail for the peace process by demonstrating that power-
sharing can be a reality
25
. 
 
The contribution by councils to ‘working’ power-sharing at local level has 
been hard fought, and not without major controversy in some authorities which cling 
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to the vestiges of majoritarianism and unionist domination. This is particularly true 
where Sinn Féin is vying for the post of chair, mayor or lord mayor, the political 
symbolism of which is simply too much for die-hard unionists to accept. The case is 
best illustrated by Sinn Féin’s success in securing the post of Lord Mayor of Belfast 
for the first time in its history. 
 
Belfast City Council – mayoral symbolism writ large 
The 1997 local government elections were a turning point in the politics of 
Belfast City Council, by far the largest local authority in Northern Ireland. The 
mainstream unionist parties lost control of Belfast local government, thereby 
producing its first elected nationalist Lord Mayor. Sinn Féin and the Ulster Unionist 
Party secured most seats (13 each) and the Alliance Party held the balance of power
2
. 
One century of unionist control of Belfast City Council ended when Alban 
Maginness, an SLDP barrister, secured the post with support from Sinn Féin and the 
Alliance. Although Sinn Féin held the largest number of nationalist/republican seats, 
neither the SDLP nor Alliance would support a republican candidate without an IRA 
ceasefire. Sinn Féin reasoned that the symbolism of the first nationalist lord mayor 
was so momentous that they supported Maginness. Ulster Unionist councillor Jim 
Rodgers was elected unopposed as deputy Lord Mayor. In what was seen as one of 
Unionism’s most potent institutions, Belfast City Council, had shuffled in. Lord 
Mayor Maginness, on accepting the mayoral chain, which ironically given its unionist 
‘ownership’ bore the Irish inscription ‘Eireann Go Brea’ (Ireland forever), avoided the 
temptation of triumphalism:  
 
Tonight, the political mould has been broken. Its fracture does not mark a 
defeat of one tradition by another, nor is it a victory. Rather, it signifies a bold 
step towards the creation of a partnership amongst the political traditions in 
this divided city. A partnership in which there is neither victory nor defeat but 
the triumph of tolerance
26
. 
 
This magnanimous approach contrasted sharply with a more resolute response 
from Gerry Adams, Sinn Féin president, who welcomed the election of a nationalist 
Lord Mayor by commenting ‘the days of unionist domination are over forever and 
                                                 
2
 In the 1997 local government elections to Belfast City Council: unionists/loyalists won 25 seats (UUP 
= 13; DUP = 7; PUP = 3; UDP = 1; Unionist = 1); nationalists/loyalists won 20 seats (Sinn Féin = 13; 
SDLP = 7); and, Alliance Party won 6 seats. 
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Sinn Féin is absolutely determined to ensure that they will never return’27. The first 
powerful test of mayoral symbolism for Mr Maginness came when he participated in 
a wreath-laying ceremony at the Cenotaph outside Belfast City Hall to commemorate 
the fallen at the Battle of the Somme in which soldiers of the 36
th
 Ulster Division 
were killed. Maginness had not attended the ceremony previously, claiming the 
political climate was not amenable to his being there. He was joined by his Dublin 
counterpart, Mr. Brendan Lynch. The symbolism was potent. This was the first time 
that a nationalist Lord Mayor had led the procession at the ceremony and it was also 
the first time that a Dublin Lord Mayor had attended. The DUP accused the Lord 
Maginness of ‘blatant hypocrisy’, arguing ‘we can conclude that nationalists were 
dragged into this event out of embarrassment rather than out of civic duty and true 
respect for those who laid down their lives’28. Maginness, although overtly inclusive, 
started to chip away at the British traditions associated with the post of Lord Mayor. 
He opted not to toast the Royal Family in keeping with tradition at his inaugural 
dinner and removed the Union Flag from the Lord Mayor’s parlour in a bid, according 
to Maginness, to depoliticise the office of Belfast’s First Citizen. 
 
The 2001 local government witnessed a further increase in 
nationalist/republican representation on Belfast City Council with Sinn Féin 
becoming the largest political party
3
. The Alliance, still holding the balance of power, 
joined with the SDLP and republicans in June 2002 to elect Alex Maskey, Belfast’s 
first Sinn Féin Lord Mayor. Maskey, a senior provisional republican and anti-
monarchist, first elected to City Hall in 1983 where he attended his first meeting 
wearing a bullet proof vest, was an abhorrent figure to unionists. The support of the 
three Alliance councillors was the crucial, but by no means certain, ingredient 
securing his mayoral election. One observer captured the tension thus: 
 
Unionists stared sullenly across the floor of the chamber on the Alliance 
benches. From Sinn Féin benches the questioning glances towards Alliance 
reflected republican anxiety that the trio would recant at the eleventh hour and 
plead ‘not guilty’ to the charge that they were handing the keys of unionism’s 
citadel to the ‘Provo Pariah’29. 
                                                 
3
 In the 2001 local government elections to Belfast City Council: unionists/loyalists won 25 seats (UUP 
= 11; DUP = 10; PUP = 3; UDP = 1); nationalists/loyalists won 20 seats (Sinn Féin = 14; SDLP = 9); 
and, Alliance Party won 3 seats. 
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Unionists reacted to Maskey’s election by walking out after this hugely 
historic and symbolic decision was taken and refusing to propose anyone for the 
position of Deputy Lord Mayor. They declined to nominate anyone for election 
arguing that it gave credibility to the city’s first republican mayor. Maskey appealed 
to unionists, beneath portraits in Belfast City Hall of Queen Victoria and King 
Edward VII, symbols of the British establishment and repugnant to republicans, 
‘judge me on what you see me doing and saying’. The DUP said the election was ‘a 
night of shame for the city, a night of sadness for those who have suffered at the 
hands of the IRA over the last 20 years’30. 
 
The civic leadership expected of Belfast’s republican Lord Mayor was soon to 
be tested. Maskey attended the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in 
Ireland with some 1,200 delegates where the Moderator welcomed ‘the chief citizen 
of Belfast… to a Christian assembly... where we are in the business of trying to 
understand each other, to dialogue with each other’.  The DUP accused Irish 
Presbyterians of ‘giving cover to Maskey who is stained by the blood of innocents31. 
Maskey then faced the same dilemma as the first SDLP Lord Mayor in 
commemorating the Somme. Republicans have traditionally refused to attend wreath-
laying ceremonies, arguing they are closely associated with the British military 
establishment. Following internal party discussions (and dissension) the republican 
Lord Mayor laid a wreath at the Cenotaph at the Somme anniversary after which he 
said ‘this is a major step for republicans and nationalists on this island. I hope the 
initiative will be seen at face value and as a positive gesture’32. The Lord Mayor 
followed this event by laying a wreath at a ceremony in Belgium in memory of those 
from the island of Ireland (north and south) who died in the battle of the Somme. 
 
Maskey’s mayoral tenure was helped on the wider front by the IRA’s 
unprecedented public apology to the families of ‘non-combatants’ killed by the 
paramilitary group during the ‘troubles’ and a restatement of its commitment to the 
peace process. Maskey also held a high-profile meeting with John White, a member 
of the Ulster Political Research Group, the main conduit for the views of the Ulster 
Defence Association (UDA), a paramilitary group which had tried to (and almost 
succeeded) assassinate him. The meeting had been arranged to defuse escalating 
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sectarian tensions in Belfast and was described as a triumph of political necessity or 
expediency over mutual loathing
33
.  
 
In an office where symbols matter, Maskey had promised the Alliance Party, 
in return for their support to get elected, that he would not strip the Lord Mayor’s 
parlour of unionist paraphernalia and replace these with trappings of republican 
history. Instead, he placed a tricolour (the flag of the Irish Republic), presented to him 
by a former IRA prisoner at a civic ceremony, alongside the Union flag, photographs 
of Queen Elizabeth, Prince Phillip and the late Queen Mother. He justified this as a 
move towards equality and respect for the two traditions in Northern Ireland where 
both flags had a place in the mayoral parlour. Maskey also held a City Hall reception 
for members of the old soldiers’ charity, the Royal British Legion, the first Mayor to 
do so and ironically boycotted by unionists. In a further attempt to represent both 
traditions, the Lord Mayor explored the possibility of meeting the Duke of York who 
was to participate in a Royal Irish Regiment ceremony where he was Colonel-in-
Chief. For a high-profile republican like Maskey, meeting a British Royal invited 
anger from his grassroots. In an attempt to balance civic leadership with his political 
and ideological beliefs, he tried to negotiate the conditions of the meeting, particularly 
to ensure what he described as ‘no British military symbolism’34. He could not meet 
with someone in British military uniform given his implacable opposition to 
everything the British monarchy stood for. The British at the last minute, according to 
Maskey, changed the Prince’s schedule from a private civic reception to a public 
event with military overtones, making the Lord Mayor’s attendance impossible.  
 
Strategically, Sinn Féin had carefully considered plans for Maskey’s mayoral 
role. The party explained: 
 
We wanted to use Alex Maskey as a kind of ambassador, following on from 
the success of Martin McGuinness and Bairbre de Brún (former Sinn Féin 
Assembly Ministers). We wanted to prove to unionists that they would be 
under no threat whenever Sinn Féin was in power, whether that was in Belfast 
or in a united Ireland
35
. 
 
Handing over the chain of office in June 2003, Maskey called on all future mayors to 
sign a pledge of office compelling them to represent all the people of Belfast, and give 
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a written commitment to reach out to both communities and restore international 
confidence in a city whose image was synonymous with sectarianism. The outgoing 
Lord Mayor remarked: ‘the City Hall didn’t burn down as some unionists had 
predicted and, hopefully, the efforts I made to reach out to unionists can be built and 
strengthened by myself and others in the years ahead’36. Sinn Féin had now ‘worked’ 
two symbolically important political institutions – Stormont and Belfast City Hall. 
Detractors found it difficult to criticise their commitment, those within Sinn Féin and 
the IRA saw it as an integral part of implementing the internal arrangements (strand 1) 
of the Belfast Agreement. 
 
 
Conclusions: beyond symbolism  
The potency of mayoral symbolism and how this has been used in the wider 
political process in Northern Ireland goes well beyond the functional importance of 
local government as a democratic entity. Creating power-sharing arrangements is the 
most obvious manifestation of how the role of chairs and mayors has been hugely 
influential. This is not confined to Belfast.  Several Northern Ireland councils now 
engage in power-sharing, a practice, they argue, which originated through rotating the 
chair/mayor’s position between local political parties well before it became integral to 
the principles of devolved government in the shape of the Northern Ireland Assembly.  
Former SDLP Deputy First Minister, Mark Durkan, claimed that Derry City Council 
was where power-sharing between unionists and nationalists first operated. He 
described the city as a ‘trailblazer’ and claimed Derry ‘has a great track record and 
great potential. So much of the thinking that inspired the Belfast Agreement was tried 
and perfected in this city over many years. We are pace setters and we must continue 
to be’37.  
 
Not only has learning been transferred upwards to the Assembly, but 
increasingly councils have adopted more formalised power-sharing arrangements than 
previously existed. The d’Hondt system of proportional representation was adopted 
by the Northern Ireland Assembly to allocate seats in the executive, and appoint 
committee chairs and deputy-chairs. Several councils have now adopted this process 
as their modus operandi, although a small number remain recalcitrant. Lisburn City 
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Council, for example, the second largest council area in Northern Ireland (which 
gained city status in 2002) is accused of excluding nationalists from all key positions 
and refusing to adopt any form of power-sharing arrangement. This has prompted the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (in Dublin) to monitor the allocation of offices in 
response to a complaint from Sinn Féin4.  Recently, invitations to Lisburn City 
Council’s mayoral banquet excluded Sinn Féin councillors at the behest of the DUP 
mayor. Under pressure from council officials, his decision was overturned but he 
remained unapologetic: ‘If it was down to me there would be no Sinn Féin members 
there. It is certainly not a U-turn by me. I had been given to understand that the 
invitations to the mayoral banquet were at the Mayor’s discretion. I was later 
informed this is not the case’38. The Mayor pledged to hold a toast to the Queen 
during the banquet to rebuff Sinn Féin’s inclusion. 
 
These remaining vestiges of political exclusivity, exercised through the 
election of the chair/mayor of local authorities, raise two general issues. First, debates 
about the possibility of directly elected mayors/chairs in the Northern Irish context 
have been mostly rejected as divisive and likely to compound sectarianism. For 
example, in a debate in Derry City Council on the merits of having a mayor directly 
elected by the public every 4 years, the (then) DUP mayor (Mildred Garfield) argued 
she would be the city’s last unionist mayor if the proposal became a reality. Given 
Derry’s large nationalist majority, it is highly likely that a public vote would displace 
existing power-sharing arrangements to rotate the mayoralty between parties with a 
nationalist/republican first citizen. This would do little to foster harmony and good 
relations in the city.  
 
Second, local authorities are now part of a wider review of public 
administration currently underway. Initiated by the Northern Ireland Assembly in 
2002, this has continued despite the on/off nature of devolution. It has recently 
launched final proposals for consultation which stress that whatever form of local 
government emerged, it would need ‘to be underpinned by a range of statutory 
safeguards on the operation of councils if confidence and trust in the new 
arrangements were to be achieved’. The statutory arrangements, the review argued, 
                                                 
4
 Lisburn City Council comprises: 13 UUP members; 5 DUP members; two independent unionists; 3 
SDLP members; 4 Sinn Féin members; and 3 Alliance Party members. 
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‘should provide a framework of checks and balances under which councils would 
conduct their business and ensure equality and fairness in decision-making’39. These 
proposals, it appears, are an oblique acknowledgement of the merits of power-sharing 
where it has happened voluntarily between political parties keen to built trust at local 
government level, but also a recognition that such principles have not been 
universally applied. As the review envisages returning greater powers to local 
government, then ‘equality and fairness in decision-making’ become yet more 
important, not least because of the history of local government malpractice before 
1973. The proposed new safeguards would undoubtedly include reference to the 
election of the chair, mayor or lord mayor of local authorities and a more detailed 
explication of his/her civic leadership role. 
 
What the Northern Ireland case illustrates is that the seemingly innocuous role 
of local heads of state, presiding over a relatively small-scale tier of governance, is 
imbued with powerful political symbolism, with wider constitutional ramifications. In 
the absence of any other democratic forum for long periods since 1973, local 
government became a laboratory for power-sharing arrangements, which were later to 
form the whole edifice of the Belfast Agreement. How chairs, mayors and lord 
mayors played out their respective roles at the local level influenced the prospects of 
securing a workable power-sharing Assembly with major functional responsibilities. 
In short, the part played by local heads of state in the Northern Ireland context has 
been disproportionately significant in the wider political and constitutional arena and 
well beyond a civic leadership role in relatively powerless local councils. 
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Appendix 1: Council Mayors/Chairs - 2004 / 2005 
Council Mayor / Chairperson Deputy Mayor / Vice - Chairperson 
Antrim Cllr Bobby Loughran (SDLP) Cllr Drew Ritchie (UUP) 
Ards Cllr Hamilton Gregory (DUP) Cllr Angus Carson (UUP) 
Armagh Cllr Eric Speers (UUP) Cllr John Campbell (SDLP) 
Ballymena Cllr Hubert Nicholl (DUP) Cllr T. G. A. Scott (UUP) 
Ballymoney Cllr Cecil Cousley (DUP) Cllr Ian Stevenson (DUP) 
Banbridge Cllr Ian Burns (UUP) Cllr John Hanna (UUP) 
Belfast Cllr Tom Ekin (Alliance) Cllr Joseph O'Donnell (Sinn Féin) 
Carrickfergus Ald David Hilditch MLA (DUP) Cllr Eric Ferguson (UUP) 
Castlereagh Cllr Ms Joanne Bunting (DUP) Cllr David Drysdale (UUP) 
Coleraine Cllr Robert McPherson (UUP) Ald James McClure (DUP) 
Cookstown Cllr Patrick Pearse McAleer (Sinn Féin) Cllr Trevor Wilson (UUP) 
Craigavon Ald David Simpson (DUP) Cllr Ignatius Fox (SDLP) 
Derry Cllr Garoid O’hEara (Sinn Féin) Ald Joe Miller (DUP) 
Down Cllr Robert Burgess (UUP) Cllr Carmel O'Boyle (SDLP) 
Dungannon Cllr Robert Mulligan (UUP) Cllr W. J. McIlwrath (DUP) 
Fermanagh Cllr Gerry McHugh (Sinn Féin) Cllr John O'Kane (SDLP) 
Larne Cllr Roy Craig (Independent) 
Cllr Ms Gerardine Mulvenna 
(Alliance) 
Limavady Cllr Jack Rankin (UUP) Cllr Michael Coyle (SDLP) 
Lisburn Cllr Cecil Calvert (DUP) Cllr Bill Gardiner-Watson (UUP) 
Magherafelt Cllr Patsy Groogan (Sinn Féin) Cllr R. A. Montgomery (Independent) 
Moyle Cllr Mr Michael Molloy (SDLP) Cllr George Hartin (DUP) 
Newry & 
Mourne 
Cllr Henry Riley (UUP) Cllr John Feehan (SDLP) 
Newtownabbey Ald E. A. Turkington (UUP) Ald W. H. DeCourcey (DUP) 
North Down Cllr Ms Valerie Kinghan (UKUP) Cllr John Montgomery (DUP) 
Omagh Cllr Sean Clarke (Sinn Féin) Cllr Thomas Buchanan MLA (DUP) 
Strabane Cllr Jarlath McNulty (Sinn Féin) Cllr Ms Ann Bell (SDLP) 
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